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IS HARD POSITIVISM TOO HARD TO SWALLOW?
JASON C. GLAHN*
One of the most contentious debates in contemporary jurisprudence is
conducted by those who broadly adhere to the doctrine of legal positivism.'
These legal positivists agree that there are no important necessary
connections between moral validity and legal validity.2 Recently, John
Garner has given a sophisticated and plausible definition of legal positivism
as, "[i]n any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence
whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not
its merits." 3 This definition clears up numerous confusions which, hereto-
fore, ran rampant in legal philosophy. 4
Garner points out that law and morality can have numerous necessary
connections, but that such connections are limited to properties irrelevant to
answering the question, "What is law?" 5 Likewise, he notes that the law
can contain moral propositions (i.e. the law could contain a rule such as "no
man may profit from his own wrongdoing"), but that such propositions are
identified as the "law" solely in virtue of their pedigree. 6
With such confusions out of the way, it is possible to conduct an
inquiry into what has become known in the literature as the "Hart/Raz"
debate. 7 This debate involves a fundamental difference in thought between
two different schools of legal positivists.8 Although all legal positivists
adopt the aforementioned Garner thesis, they differ as to whether moral
*Ph.D. Program (Philosophy) University of Missouri-Columbia; M.A. (Philosophy)
University of Missouri-Columbia 2004; J.D., cum laude, University of Texas-Austin; Editorial
Board Texas Law Review 2001-2002. I thank professors Robert N. Johnson, Philip G. Peters, and
Peter Vallentyne for their excellent comments and the members of the North Dakota Law Review
for their conscientious editing.
1. John Garner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199 (2001). Garner
initially defines legal positivism as "a broad legal tradition, distinguished by an emphasis on
certain aspects of legal thought and experience, namely, the empirical aspects." Id.
2. Garner, supra note 1, at 222.
3. Id. at 199.
4. See, e.g., id. at 222-25 (rejecting the idea that law and morality share no necessary connec-
tions as absurd).
5. Id. at 222-23.
6. Id. at 224.
7. See Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Juris-
prudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 19 (2003) (presenting the Hart/Raz and the Hart/Dworkin debates).
8. Id.
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criteria can be "incorporated" into the law.9 That is, they disagree about
whether moral norms, qua moral norms can serve as legitimate criteria for
legal validity.' 0 Thus, "soft positivists" (also known as "inclusive positi-
vists") accept the claim that the law can incorporate moral criteria of legal
validity, while "hard positivists" (also known as "exclusive positivists")
deny this claim." Quite simply, soft positivists believe that it is possible
that in some societies, one must engage in moral reasoning in order to
determine what the law is.12 Hard positivists believe that in order to answer
questions about the content of the law, one cannot engage in moral
reasoning. 13
In this essay, I consider the merits of the most important extant
versions of hard positivism. I argue that, ultimately, the costs of pursuing a
hard positivist theory of law are too great to bear. Generally, I will claim
that hard positivist conceptions of law are either untenable on their own
terms, or lead to drastic "spill-over effects" in which the scope of what is
termed "law" is severely limited in an implausible fashion.
In Part I of the essay, I set up a methodological framework for con-
sidering the Hart/Raz debate. 14 Thus, I endeavor to provide plausible work-
ing definitions for concepts such as "moral norm" or "pedigree criteria" that
arise in jurisprudential debate. I also briefly outline the view known as
"soft positivism" and a current conception of natural law theory so that the
claims of such theories may, when they are relevant, be compared and con-
trasted with the positions of those engaged in the Hart/Raz debate. 15 Part 11
of the essay involves a brief exposition of the strategies available to the
hard positivist.16 Thus, I outline several ways in which a hard positivist
strategy might succeed and consider which ones are the most promising. In
Part III, I consider the initial and most important hard positivist argument
put forward by Joseph Raz.17 This argument makes use of the idea that the
law must claim authority and that moral norms cannot, of necessity, claim
this requisite type of legal authority. Part IV involves the consideration of
an additional hard positivist argument put forward by Andrei Marnoor
which claims that moral norms cannot be incorporated into the law because
9. See id. at 20 (discussing whether "principles" can be binding under either the Hart or
Dworkin views).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 25.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.A.
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they necessarily fail to serve the proper function of guiding human
behavior. 18 This guidance function argument is weaker than Raz's initial
claims and involves a more sophisticated development of hard positivist
thought. 19
Scott Shapiro also provides hard positivist arguments based on the
law's function in guiding human behavior. 20 He develops views concerning
the relationship of the law to both persons in authority and average
citizens. 21 I consider several of these hard positivist arguments in Part V of
the essay. I conclude briefly in Part VI with the observation that serious
difficulties face all of the most promising extant versions of hard
positivism.
I. THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE
A. WHAT DO THE THEORIES OF LAW CLAIM?
In contemporary jurisprudence, there are three major responses to the
question, "What is the law?" 22 Modern, natural law theorists such as Lon
Fuller advocate the view that any properly designated "legal system"
necessarily contains fundamental moral norms which serve to legitimate the
legal system.23 According to Fuller, those constructing legal systems must
aspire to follow at least eight major moral principles which he claims con-
stitute the content of the rule of law. 24 Thus, on Fuller's conception, all
legal systems must share principles such as: (1) the achievement of stable
rules, (2) the promulgation of rules, (3) resistance to most retroactive
regulation, (4) a mandate to make rules intelligible, (5) the avoidance of
conflicting rules, (6) the requirement that laws can be followed, (7) stability
of rules so that they guide behavior, and (8) a congruence between the rules
18. See Andrei Marmoor, Exclusive Legal Positivism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 105 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
(introducing his view of the interplay between law and morality). See also infra Part IV.A.
19. See id. (arguing that the role of morality in "any legal system" is "contingent" upon
already established rules).
20. See Scott Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in HART'S POST SCRIPT 153 (Jules Coleman ed.,
2001) (discussing regulation of human behavior or "conduct").
21. See id. at 173 (stating that legal rules serve as "intermediaries between officials and non
officials").
22. Matthew H. Kramer, On Morality as a Necessary or Sufficient Condition for Legality, 48
AM. J. JURIS. 53, 53-54 (2003).
23. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed., 1969) (discussing the need
for morality and moral standards in formulating legal standards). Many legal philosophers note
that the debate between the legal positivists and Fuller's followers has not reached any conclusive
resolution. Leiter, supra note 7, at 30-51 (examining claims that normative criteria are essential
for describing and demarcating a legal system).
24. See FULLER, supra note 23, at 39.
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and the actual application of the rules. 25 Hence, modem natural law theory
merely claims that law has an "inner morality," not that legal propositions
must be identical with moral norms. 26
In contrast to this view, soft positivists such as H.L.A. Hart maintain
that law may always be determined by reference to "pedigree criteria" such
as social practices, legislation, and judicial decisions.27 In order to deter-
mine what the law is, one must identify a "rule of recognition" for a
particular society.28 Such rules of recognition are "secondary rules" which
are defined as rules governing the proper formation of other rules (known as
"primary rules") that, in turn, serve to regulate human conduct. 29 Which
rule of recognition obtains in a society is purely a matter of social fact.
According to Hart, rules of recognition must be generally obeyed by ordi-
nary citizens (for whatever reason) and explicitly considered to be
motivational by those in authority. 30 Hence, once one has identified the
rule of recognition via a sociological investigation, one is in a position to
know the laws of the society in question.
Hart's soft positivism allows for moral criteria of legal validity. 3' So
long as the moral proposition in question has been picked out by the criteria
set forth in the relevant rule of recognition, it is the law. 32 Thus, the law
may require those in authority to engage in moral reasoning in order to
determine what is required in a particular case. Hart appears to endorse the
claim that even though a requirement of moral reasoning may introduce
some uncertainty about what the law is, the content of most non-moral laws
is similarly uncertain. 33 Therefore, soft positivism would allow for moral
reasoning to determine the content of the law in every society if, as a matter
of contingent fact, every society followed a rule of recognition that con-
tained such a requirement. 34
25. Id.
26. Id. at 41-42.
27. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 269 (2d ed., Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1997).
28. Id. at 92. See generally id. at 79-99.
29. Id. at 91-92.
30. Id. at 116-17.
31. Id. at 72-73, 247.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 250- 54.
34. Technically, soft positivists merely hold the view that "it is still a conceptual possi-
bility.., for there to be... a legal system in which morality is not a criterion of legal validity."
Leiter, supra note 7, at 25.
[VOL. 8 1:499
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II. HARD POSITIVIST STRATEGIES
A. IN GENERAL
Hard positivists deny the possibility of incorporating moral criteria into
the requirements of law.35 One way to reach that result is simply to deny
the existence of any sort of objective morality. Although this strategy may
ultimately prove plausible, it involves one of the central questions of meta-
ethics and, hence, I will pass over the issues raised in that sophisticated and
ongoing debate.36 Leaving aside the meta-ethical debate, the most prom-
ising strategy for the hard positivist is to show that, necessarily, moral
norms cannot function as criteria of legal validity. 37 This may be shown by
discovering a property possessed by anything properly designated as "law"
that cannot, as a matter of logic, be possessed by moral norms in so far as
they are evaluated with reference to their normative characteristics.
Some hard positivists, such as Joseph Raz, claim that the relevant
property is a claim to authority, whereas others have claimed that it is the
guidance of behavior.38 If the claims of such theories are true, then it
follows that, necessarily, moral reasoning cannot play any role in deter-
mining what the law is. 39 Thus, the hard positivist thesis has some
substantive bite. However, hard positivists can still maintain that normative
considerations can/should play a role in deciding what the law ought to be
and, indeed, in the creation of new law whether by judicial act or legislative
pronouncement.no
B. WHAT IS A MORAL NORM?
To conduct an analysis of the relationship between law and morality,
one must have some reasonably clear idea of the nature of "moral
35. See Leiter, supra note 7, at 20 (stating that "'principles' do not control the outcome of a
case").
36. For a good look at the current state of the debate over the status of moral propositions
and their relation to law see generally BRIAN LEITER, OBJEcTIvITY IN LAW AND MORALS (2001)
(providing numerous essays on the "objectivity" of ethical norms and their interaction with legal
concerns).
37. I take it that no one wants to endorse the converse of the "meta-ethical" solution by
denying the existence of the "law!"
38. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (introducing
Raz's theories).
39. See id. at 3-4 (discussing the contradictions between adherence to authority and one's
own moral autonomy).
40. This appears to be Raz's own position. Unlike Leiter, he endorses objectivity in ethics
and claims that the law should aim at moral truths. RAZ, supra note 35, at 210-12 (arguing that the
descriptive question of "What is the law?" is separable from the equally, if not more important
question "What makes a legal system good?").
20051
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requirements." Unfortunately, most legal philosophers fail to specify what
they mean by "morality," and instead, spend a great deal of time specifying
what they mean by "law," when discussing the relationship between the two
concepts. 4' It is safe to assume that most legal philosophers either accept
the objectivity of morality (otherwise there would seem to be no need for
debate) or abstain from holding any meta-ethical theory and merely acting
as if morality is "objective" in some sense.42
In any case, I will employ a definition of moral requirement that
assumes objectivity in the sense common to most extant positions in norma-
tive ethics such as deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Thus, I pro-
pose to define moral requirements in terms of propositions that (1) regulate
the conduct of rational beings, (2) are not dependent for their truth/falsity
on individual evaluative judgments or societal norms, and (3) impose a
prima facie requirement for action on those to whom they apply. The third
condition is widely assumed within both legal academia and philosophy,4 3
whereas the other conditions are either assumed to be true or taken as true
by most of those engaged in analytic jurisprudence. 44 Therefore, I shall
operate with this definition of morality. 45
III. RAZ'S ARGUMENT FOR HARD POSITIVISM
A. THE FORM OF THE ARGUMENT
The most important argument in favor of hard positivism, generally
known as the "argument from authority," is put forward by Joseph Raz.46
Generally, the argument claims that law must claim authority in a specific
41. See infra note 45.
42. Hart claims that analytic jurisprudence should be neutral concerning questions of meta-
ethics, but continue its analysis of the relationship between law and morality nonetheless. HART,
supra note 27, at 253-54.
43. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1159-
61 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
(1998)).
44. See infra note 45.
45. Many soft positivists take this position. Philip Soper, Searching for Positivism, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 1739, 1749-52 (1996) (reviewing W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)). Of course, one could do analytic jurisprudence using the no-
tion of societally based moral norms. If moral norms are relative to societies, then soft positivists
would allow that they are part of the law so long as they satisfy a rule of recognition making ref-
erence to societal beliefs. See infra Part III.A. Hard positivists would probably exclude societal
based norms because they are not determinate enough to serve as exclusionary reasons for action.
See infra Part III.B.2.
46. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Book Review, JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1655, 1655-56 ("Coleman names Professor Joseph Raz of Oxford as the leading contemporary
proponent of exclusive positivism .... ").
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way that moral norms are, in principle, incapable of doing. 47  More
formally, Raz's argument may be stated as follows:
(1) Necessarily, the law claims legitimate authority.48
(2) Some practice (or person) X can have legitimate authority over
a person Y if and only if Y treats the reasons given by X that com-
mand Y to 4) as "exclusionary reasons" for Y to 4).49
(3) In order for Y to treat the reasons given by X for 4-ing as
"exclusionary reasons" it must be the case that Y treats X as a
"practical authority" and believes that she is better off 4-ing for the
reasons given by X than she would be if she were to attempt to
determine whether or not to 4) on her own. 50
(4) It is not possible for Y to rely upon X as a "practical authority"
if X cannot provide Y with reasons to 4) separate from those rea-
sons for 4)-ing that Y could consider on her own.51
(5) Necessarily, X cannot serve as a "practical authority" for Y if
X commands Y to 4) or not-) on the basis of Y's consideration of
moral reasons for 4-ing or note-ing.52
(6) Therefore, X cannot claim legitimate authority over Y if X
commands Y to act on the basis of her (Y's) own moral
judgment.53 [(1)-(5)]
(7) Necessarily, moral principles cannot claim legitimate
authority.54 [(6)]
(8) Necessarily, moral principles cannot be part of the law.
[(1),(6)]
As previously mentioned, Raz's argument merely precludes the use of
moral criteria in discerning legal validity.55 Thus, he would allow that
47. See RAZ, supra note 34, at 4 (stating that those who believe in the compatibility of law
and morality are "committed to an irrational belief").
48. Id.
49. Id. at 19-20.
50. Id. at 20. This premise is Andrei Marmoor's quite plausible interpretation of Raz.
Marnoor, supra note 18, at 109. An "exclusionary reason" for action is a reason that one takes to
be persuasive despite any other reasons one might have for acting or not acting in a particular
instance. Thus, if I have an exclusionary reason to vote for Ralph Nader, then I will in fact vote
for Ralph Nader whether or not I have any other reasons to vote for or against him.
51. RAZ, supra note 34, at 20.
52. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 37-39 (emphasis added).
20051
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moral propositions can be part of the law. For example, Raz could claim
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is both a
legal rule (via its pedigree of conforming to the rule of recognition opera-
tive in our society) and a moral principle. 56 However, he could go on to say
that the Equal Protection clause cannot be identified as "law" in virtue of
whatever status it has as a moral principle; rather, Raz would claim that the
Equal Protection Clause can be identified as "law" only via the rule of
recognition. 57 Whether Raz's argument is correct, therefore, depends on the
answer to the question of whether moral reasoning can (possibly) play a
role in the identification of the law.
Thus, in order to critique Raz's argument, one could dispute at least
one of its premises by claiming that law does not have the requisite pro-
perties (such as "claiming authority") that he believes that is has. One
could also argue that clear cases of law fail to meet Raz's criteria, or one
could show that moral principles can meet Raz's criteria despite his asser-
tions. I shall pursue all three strategies.
B. OBJECTIONS TO RAZ'S ARGUMENT
1. The Argument Rules Out Obviously Valid "Laws"
Some might claim that Raz's hard positivist approach impermissibly
rules out many prima facie valid types of laws. For example, an absolute
ruler (call him Rex) might promulgate a rule such as: Adjudicate property
disputes according to the dictates of fairness. Likewise, a government seek-
ing to form a legitimate society could operate with a law such as: Choose
social institutions behind a veil of ignorance.58 A hard positivist would say
that such a command cannot be a law because it requires the judge to en-
gage in moral reasoning about the nature of fairness, rather than providing
him with the reasons for ruling in any particular case.59 The hard positivist
response might seem plausible, however, given the truth of their assertions
about the authority of law. For the hard positivist, legal reasoning should
55. Id. But see Garner, supra note 1, at 222-25 (stating that it is absurd to assert that law and
morality have no connection).
56. Many philosophers of law make this exact claim. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Thirty
Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2002) (reviewing JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001)).
57. See RAZ, supra note 38, at 20.
58. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-123 (1999) (stating that people
in similar situations, including reasoning processes and objectives, are likely to make decisions
based on their perception of the situation).




supplant moral reasoning because laws identified through a rule of
recognition should function as exclusionary reasons. 60
What if everyone had a similar conception of fairness or everyone
agreed on the interpretation of the veil of ignorance principle? The hard
positivist could claim that such facts are irrelevant. If the law contains a
reference to fairly determinate terms or moral theories, then the hard posi-
tivist can maintain her position by claiming that laws (admittedly con-
taining moral propositions) are valid only in virtue of their identification
using social facts and their consequent interpretation. Thus, someone fol-
lowing the dictates of a moral proposition need not engage in any moral
reasoning; they are in the same position as one who follows instructions on
how to bake cookies and treats the instructions for baking cookies as
authoritative. Likewise, someone can obey a moral rule and treat it as an
"exclusionary reason" for action solely in virtue of its possessing the right
pedigree-i.e., having those features necessary to confer upon it the status
of law.61
2. Hard Positivism Rules Out Many Non-Moral Types of Law
This objection has been noticed, but underappreciated by hard
positivists. 62 Generally, hard positivists admit that their view allows for
fewer rules to be designated as "laws" than their soft positivist opponents.
63
Because of their focus on authority defined as treating rules identified via
the rule of recognition as "exclusionary reasons," hard positivists must
admit that any "law" requiring significant interpretation cannot claim
authority in the requisite way.64
However, the full force of this problem is only realized once one ana-
lyzes the hard positivist approach as applied to paradigm cases of legal
interpretation. Fortunately, in the field of Constitutional Law, Philip
Bobbitt has identified six paradigm "modalities" for legitimate legal argu-
ment: historical argument, textual argument, doctrinal argument, prudential
argument, structural argument, and "ethical" argument (defined in terms of
seeking societal consensus not morally objective truths).65 None of these
60. See id. at 25 (analyzing the hard positivist view of the Rule of Recognition).
61. See id. (referring to Raz's view on the "pedigree" of moral rules).
62. Gamer, supra note 1, at 222-23.
63. See Leiter, supra note 7, at 25-28 (noting that inclusive positivism can admit that a broad
class of principles are law even though judges must apply significant discretion in their inter-
pretation and application).
64. See id. at 220-23 (stating in essence that lawmaking and interpretation occur by relying
on tested and proven principles held evident by preceding legalists and that laws requiring
significant interpretation may be accepted as precedent less widely).
65. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-8 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
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modalities depends upon moral considerations, and taken together, Bobbitt
claims that they represent the legitimate types of legal argument found
within the United States.66
How does the hard positivist position treat the use of such "modalities"
of legal interpretation? Not kindly. For example, consider the case of a
constitutional cannon claiming that judges should discern "original intent."
Such a canon apparently mandates that judges consider the relevant history
of the passage of a law for themselves and pick the best interpretation.
However, hard positivists maintain that the law can claim authority if and
only if officials treat legal principles such as the aforementioned "cannon of
construction" as exclusionary reasons for acting. The cannon, however,
provides no specific guidance on how to conduct a historical investigation.
Thus, the judge is forced to consider all of the relevant (historical) reasons
for herself when deciding a case.
The same problem occurs with regard to the other modalities. If judges
decide cases according to doctrinal, textual, structural, pragmatic, or "ethi-
cal" argument, then they will be forced to consider doctrinal, textual,
structural, pragmatic, and ethical reasons of acting on their own. Thus, hard
positivists must (apparently) claim that all legal interpretation creates new
law and that, strictly speaking, the "law" includes only those propositions
that are determinate enough to act as "exclusionary reasons" for action in a
particular case.
Although this would drastically alter the way many think about the law,
it is not a knock-down blow against hard positivism. After all, once the
judge issues the ruling, a hard positivist could maintain that it "claims au-
thority" on those bound by it and hence, becomes new law at that point in
time.
3. Hard Positivism Rules Out Laws With Merely Expressive
Functions
This objection to hard positivism has not been pressed in the legal liter-
ature, and although, I will not rely heavily upon it in my overall analysis of
the case against hard positivism, it is worth noting. It is commonly known
that some laws serve only an expressive or perhaps ceremonial purpose.67
66. id.
67. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-1 (2005). The statute reads:
Whereas, lawful oaths for discovery of truth and establishing right are necessary and
highly conducive to the important end of good government; and being most solemn
appeals to Almighty God, as the omniscient witness of truth and the just and omni-
potent avenger of falsehood, and whereas, lawful affirmations for the discovery of
truth and establishing right are necessary and highly conducive to the important end of
[VOL. 81:499
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Thus, they are created in the same manner as laws designed to govern
behavior, but instead they serve only to express some societal attitude.68
For example, perhaps society wishes to commend someone for extra-
ordinary achievement or desires to express disapproval of particular actions
without criminalizing them,69 In such cases, the "laws" under consideration
cannot possibly claim authority as they are not, by nature, designed to
govern actions. However, they are identified as law via a rule of recog-
nition. Thus, a soft positivist might claim that such "laws" are legitimate
expressions of the will of society whether or not they can claim authority.
Hard positivists would likely be unmoved by such considerations.
Perhaps, they would claim that they are only interested in identifying
behavior guiding rules as "law." 70 They would not want to retreat to the
earlier positivist thesis of claiming that such "laws" are invalid because they
are not backed up by the threat of force, but could argue that laws serving
only an expressive or ceremonial function are not worthy of serious atten-
tion and can be excluded from consideration by everyone except social
scientists. 71
4. The Elusive Notion of Positivist "Authority"
In order for Raz's argument to succeed, he must establish that his
notion of "authority," which he defines in terms of acting on the basis of
"exclusionary reasons," is a property which law must necessarily have.72 If
Raz's (and all other feasible alternative) accounts of "authority" fail, then
the hard positivist argument will not be sound. It is my contention that no
feasible account of "authority" can be given. Thus, I claim that the hard
positivist will be unable to establish any notion of "authority" defined in
terms of "exclusionary reasons," that is plausible for her purposes.
good government, therefore, such oaths and affirmations ought to be taken and
administered with the utmost solemnity.
Id.
68. See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2025-29 (1996) (discussing cases in which the law functions only to influence social norms
or to make a statement of societal values).
69. Congressional resolutions are typically used to commend people and are not structured as
commands. For an example of a symbolic statute designed to show the state's moral disapproval
of abortion without criminalizing it, see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,
490-91 (1989) (interpreting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon 2004) as expressing only a value
judgment about abortion).
70. See Marmoor supra note 18, at 105.
71. Id.; see, e.g., Leiter supra note 7, at 19-30, 39.
72. See Leiter, supra note 7, at 19-30 (describing the status and methodology of the debate
between hard and soft positivists).
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Thus far, little jurisprudential attention has been given to the concept of
an "exclusionary reason" as it figures in Raz's argument. 73 In order to de-
termine whether a hard positivist can make use of such a notion, it is
essential to consider both extant and novel definitions of "exclusionary
reasons" and examine how such definitions fare in light of the general, hard
positivist project. Raz's own definition claims that a subject treats a reason
(R) to do as an exclusionary reason if and only if she would be better off
-ing for the reasons given by (R), then she would by considering any other
reasons for herself.74 Apparently, Raz gives "better off' a normative read-
ing so that the following definition of an exclusionary reason results:75
(ERI) X treats R as an exclusionary reason to p if and only if X
will behave more morally by -ing on the basis of R, than she
would by considering other reasons to 0 or not-0.76
For example, if X has an exclusionary reason, in this sense, to help the
poor, then X will not consider the force of any arguments against helping
the poor because to do so would, by definition, lead her into moral error.
If this definition of an exclusionary reason is used, however, then hard
positivism is committed to the following claim:
(CI) Necessarily, all laws must claim that X will behave more
morally on the basis of following them, than X would behave by
considering other reasons for action (or inaction).
Such a result, however, is patently false. First, no one claims that it is an
analytic truth that the law claims to provide superior normative guidance.
Granted, it is feasible to suspect that many law-makers attempt to craft laws
that do function in just this fashion. 77 However, no philosopher (or lawyer)
worth her salt would even consider advancing the claim that the law pro-
vides superior moral guidance. If such a claim is patently false, then it is
hard to see why it should be considered as a necessary condition for the
existence of law.
Of course, other difficulties abound. Take the case of a moral relativist
named Friedrich. Friedrich "internalizes" the law and generally obeys all
73. The author has discovered no extensive critique of "exclusionary reasons" as applied to
the hard positivist project of establishing a necessary separation of law and morality.
74. RAZ, supra note 38, at 22-33.
75. Id. Raz does, however, seem to allow for the concept of an exclusionary reason to be
based on types of reasons for action for he claims that, "exclusionary reasons exclude by kind and
not by weight. They may exclude all the reasons of a certain kind .... Id. at 22.
76. Id. at 37-39.
77. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 260-96 (1980) (providing
an example of a natural law theorist who claims that law should seek to provide moral guidance
and that legislators ought to pass laws with that goal in mind).
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legal commands, but he does not believe in the existence of any objective
morality. Why must the law claim moral authority in order to govern
Friedrich? Better still, could we not say that it is possible that there exists a
society with no conception of morality, yet possesses a clear idea of rule
following? Such examples illustrate the point that from a purely descriptive
(positivist) point-of-view, it seems that one need not describe the law as
claiming any sort of moral authority. Thus, both as a conceptual and empir-
ical matter, it does not seem that the hard positivist can endorse Cl.
The hard positivist could attempt to define "exclusionary reasons" in
terms of epistemic goal fulfillment of some type. Consider the following
claim:
(ER2) X treats R as an exclusionary reason to if and only if X
will make better decisions by 4-ing on the basis of R, than she
would make by considering other reasons to F or not- .78
In this case, we might suppose that the hard positivist has some kind of
truth-seeking function for law in mind. Thus, the hard positivist would be
committed to the claim that:
(C2) Necessarily, all laws must claim that X will act on more true
beliefs by following the law, than X would act upon by con-
sidering other reasons for action (or inaction). 79
Such an approach might work very well in describing the concept of
science. It seems plausible to suppose that all science is aimed at the goal
of truth-seeking about the nature of the world. Thus, one might treat a
claim like C2 as essentially necessary for any claim labeled "scientific."
Unfortunately for the hard positivist, C2 is not a plausible claim about the
law. It is well known that law often fails to aim at truth, and more
importantly-that law even fails to claim that it is aimed at epistemic
truth.80 For instance, law may be aimed at the maximization of wealth or
constructed in order to achieve economic efficiency.81 Thus, law is often
explicitly aimed at goals other than truth seeking.
The point may be even more fully shown by considering the fact that
many laws do not concern truth or falsity as such. 82 A law commanding me
not to murder is aimed at ensuring stability in society. Even the First
78. See RAZ, supra note 38, at 18-20.
79. See id. at 23-26.
80. See, e.g., Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting
"Junk Logic" About Scientific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 381, 452 (2004) (discussing the non-
epistemic functions of tort law).
81. RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 23-28 (4th ed., 1992).
82. See Walker, supra note 80, at 452.
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Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech need not be thought to be
aimed at truth seeking rather than some other goal such as maximizing
individual liberty. 83 In the worst possible case of lawmaking, one might
consider a legislature that enacts laws for no reason whatsoever or, more
likely, enacts laws for various, conflicting reasons. In such cases, the law
will not possess epistemic superiority, nor is it plausible to argue that it
must, of necessity, claim to do so.
A third formulation of hard positivist "exclusionary reasons" could
claim that:
(ER3) X treats R as an exclusionary reason to (p if and only if X
will make better instrumentally rational decisions by 4-ing on the
basis of R, than she would make by considering other reasons to 4)
or not-).
In this instance, an exclusionary reason would be defined in terms of its
ability to produce better results for an agent (taking into account their own
preferences/goals) than would otherwise be the case. Applying ER3 to
Raz's definition of authority yields:
(C3) Necessarily, all laws must claim that X will act in a more
instrumentally rational way by following the law, than X would
act by considering other reasons for action (or inaction).
However, it seems clear that the law does not (and does not purport to
claim) that following it will allow one to achieve one's goals better than if
one acted on the basis of other considerations. Since each individual has
her own, often idiosyncratic, preferences, it is incredible to suppose that the
law could take them into account. Furthermore, it seems that one of the
central functions of the law is to regulate behavior.84 Thus, the law impedes
the achievement of individual goals all of the time and even claims to do
so. 85 Therefore, it is not plausible to assume that the law must claim to be
instrumentally rational.
Perhaps, the hard positivist could claim that one should define exclu-
sionary reasons in terms of prudential action. Thus, she could advocate the
following claim:
83. See, e.g., ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 2 (1995) ("[Law creates commu-
nity when it seeks authoritatively to interpret and enforce shared mores and norms; it is
managerial when it organizes social life instrumentally to achieve specific objectives; and it
fosters democracy by establishing the social arrangements that carry for us the meaning of
collective self-determination.").
84. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 153.
85. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897) (claiming that law should be viewed from the perspective of the "bad man" who evaluates
his actions only in terms of their likely consequences).
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(ER4) X treats R as an exclusionary reason to c if and only if X
will make better prudential decisions by -ing on the basis of R,
than she would make by considering other reasons to j or not- .
By "prudential" the hard positivist could mean decisions that are in one's
best interest all things considered. However, it seems unreasonable to hold
that all law has the feature of claiming that it advocates decisions that are in
someone or some group's best interest all things considered. If the notion
of "best interest" is defined in objective terms, then we would have to
endorse:
(C4) Necessarily, all laws must claim that X will do better in an
objective sense by following the law, than X would do by
considering other reasons for action (or inaction) and acting upon
them.
This seems wrong-at least as a conceptual matter. Is it really the case that
all laws must claim to guide people for their own good? I think not. For
example, many laws might serve a governmental goal of raising revenue. It
is implausible to suppose that such codes must claim that by following them
one does better at life in any objective sense.
A slight modification of (ER4) could be made so that "prudential" is
understood to mean actions that will lead to the best outcome all things
considered-including the sanctions imposed by law! If one endorsed this
claim, then one would have to embrace the original version of positivism
adopted by John Austin who defined laws as rules backed up by force or the
threat of force.86 This position has, with good reason, been abandoned
within legal philosophy.8 7 Even if one considers it attractive, however,
there is good reason to doubt its application to the hard positivist
argument.88
This is because it is implausible to believe that the sanctions imposed
for violations of the law are always determinative of what one's best course
of action is. There are many clear cases where violations of the law will
prove more beneficial all things considered. 89 Therefore, it is not credible
to endorse the view that the law must always claim that its violation is
irrational from a purely self-interested standpoint. Often, it will be the case
86. See, e.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 126 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002).
87. See HART, supra note 27, at 50-76 (explaining that in Austin's view, if a legal rule
promulgated by the sovereign is violated, the rule can be enforced "by the threat of sanction").
88. Since moral norms could be backed up by the threat of force this fact alone cannot serve
to distinguish them from laws.
89. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH L. REv. 2385, 2389-90 (1997).
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that laws that carry very light penalties are designed merely to discourage or
show disapproval of certain acts. 90 In such cases, violations of the law will
not prove to be unduly burdensome, and one may suppose that the law
seeks only to diminish the behavior regulated through its imposition of
penalties.
Hard positivists might wish to defend the idea that exclusionary
reasons need not be "reasons" at all in the usual sense. Thus, they might
propose:
(ER5) X treats R as an exclusionary reason to 4) if and only if X
does in fact 4) for reason R.91
This claim is interesting because R is not compared with anything; rather,
the individual merely acts according to R and for no other reason
whatsoever. The fact that the law commands 4-ing is, thus, seen as an
exclusionary reason to 4).
It is somewhat unclear what to make of this suggestion which seems,
initially, quite promising for the hard positivist. After all, the hard positivist
can now assert:
(C5) Necessarily, all laws must claim that X will in fact follow
them rather than act for any other reason.92
This claim seems to be predictive in nature, however. One might question
whether it is a necessary truth that all laws claim that one will, in fact, fol-
low them. Another worry is even more relevant to the hard positivist. If
the law is to claim authority, it must claim authority over someone-either
officials or common citizens. Hard positivists agree that officials should
"internalize" the law so that they act according to the reason given by the
law. 93 However, the ER5 notion of an "exclusionary reason" might not
support the possibility of motivating an individual to perform an action.
Why does the mere belief that "X is a law which requires 4-ing" necessarily
motivate someone to 4)? If there is no additional reason to 4) (other than
one's belief that the law requires 4-ing), then is it plausible to suppose that
one will 4)? More importantly, is it plausible to suppose that a conceptually
necessary fact about the law is that it claims that one will act in accordance
with its commands merely because one knows of their status as "law"?
If the law must claim that we act for no reason, then the claim is
implausible. If, however, the claim is moderated so that it states that we
90. Id.
91. See RAZ, supra note 38, at 18.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 20, at 178-180.
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owe some sort of prima facie duty to obey the law, then almost everyone
rejects it.94 Thus, C5 does not appear to be a credible claim.
A final modification to the definition of "exclusionary reason" might
come by way of political theory. 95 One of the most promising candidates,
grounded in social contract theory, would be:
(ER6) X treats R as an exclusionary reason to 4) if and only if X
will fulfill her social obligations better by 4-ing on the basis of R,
than she would by considering other reasons to 4) or not-4). 96
If this definition is employed, then we might say that X can fulfill the
obligations of the social contract only by treating legal rules as exclusionary
reasons for action. The resulting definition of law is:
(C6) Necessarily, all laws must claim that X will better fulfill her
societal obligations by following the law, than X would do by
considering other reasons for action (or inaction) and acting upon
them.
If the hard positivist accepts this proposal, then she would be required to
provide substantive arguments in favor of social contract theory and its
essential notions of consent.97 Even worse for the hard positivist, however,
is the claim that no definition of an "exclusionary reason" in terms of extant
political theories is likely to be persuasive. 98 This is because of the huge
variety of actual (and possible) political systems. Even if C6 were a correct
claim about the way law functions in the United States or Western Europe,
it is clearly a false account of the way law functions in other societies such
as theocracies, dictatorships, monarchies, and various socialist/communist
states. All of these other societies have "law," but there is certainly no
claim that its basis is social contract theory. 99 More importantly, hard posi-
tivism is a conceptual and descriptive theory of law; thus, the mere
possibility of a legal system with a different political organization than the
94. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 34, at 234-61.
95. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1970)
(1690) (providing the most prominent and initial account of social contract theory).
96. For an excellent overview of social contract theory and political obligation, see generally
A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
(2001) (discussing the status of social and legal obligations).
97. See generally LOCKE, supra note 95. Depending of the type of social contract theory the
consent requirement could be based on hypothetical, tacit, or explicit agreement to certain rules.
98. If the notion of authority is defined in terms of a particular political order such as a
monarch or democracy, then it cannot serve to elucidate what features are common to all legal
systems.
99. See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 -260 (2004) (presenting an alternative
justification based on consequentialist considerations for the legitimacy of democratic states).
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proffered one used to define an "exclusionary reason" will serve as a
counterexample to the theory.100 Therefore, the use of political theory in
explicating the notion of an "exclusionary reason" cannot prevail; in fact, it
would be logically impossible.
5. The General Argument Against Raz's Approach
I claim that the arguments against Raz given in sections 1, 2, and 3 are
merely suggestive. However, after a complete consideration of both extant
and possible positivist interpretations of "authority," I conclude that the
arguments against Raz's hard positivism given in section 4 are decisive.
The general form of my argument is as follows:
(1) If it is true, then hard positivism must show that law claims
authority;
(2) In order to show that law claims authority, hard positivism
must provide a sense of "exclusionary reason" that is plausible;
(3) Hard positivism cannot provide a sense of "exclusionary
reason" that is plausible; and therefore,
(4) Hard positivism is not true.
I hope to have considered all of the most promising explications of an
"exclusionary reason," yet it is always possible that a new version could
arise. The burden is on the hard positivist to show that such a notion is
plausible. Given the difficulties with such an approach encountered thus
far, I would claim that providing a definition of an exclusionary reason that
can function in a necessary claim about the nature of law is a very difficult
task.
IV. ANDREI MARMOOR'S HARD POSITIVIST APPROACH
A. MARMOOR'S ARGUMENT
Recently, Andrei Marmoor has advanced a hard positivist argument in
which the purpose of all law is said to involve the guidance of behavior.101
According to Marmoor's approach moral norms lack this necessary feature
100. As with any claim, a single counterexample is sufficient to undermine a conceptual
assertion about features necessary to all legal systems. For an account of counterexamples see
RICHARD JEFFREY, FORMAL LOGIC 1-2 (3rd ed. 1991).
101. See Marmoor, supra note 18, at 105.
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of law and, thus, they cannot be used as criteria of legal validity.102 More
formally, his argument runs:
(1) Necessarily, X is a law if and only if X can be identified via
"constitutive conventions;" 103
(2) Necessarily, constitutive conventions have the function of
guiding behavior;
(3) A principle telling people to behave morally is "empty"
because it does not have the function of guiding behavior;10 4
(4) Therefore, moral principles cannot be identified (only in virtue
of) "constitutive conventions;" [(2),(3)]
(5) Therefore, moral principles cannot be law. [(1),(4)]
Marmoor's argument appears to be significantly more externalist than Raz's
approach. Whereas Raz's view of "authority" focuses on weighing reasons
for action, Marmoor's "guidance function" criteria for law is based only on
the possibility of guiding behavior according to the dictates of social con-
ventions. 105 Marmoor contends that the law cannot incorporate moral
principles because such principles cannot properly guide behavior; the
subject must consider the moral reasons for herself and, thus, determine
what to do on her own. 106 This is unacceptable to Marmoor who conceives
of the law as guiding the behavior of its subjects by specifying the reasons
upon which they must act. 107
B. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO MARMOOR
1. Denying the "Guidance Function" of Constitutive
Conventions
Like Raz's argument, Marmoor's is open to question if one holds the
view that the law can serve expressive purposes. 108 Likewise, one could
argue that the point of the law is often to allow individuals autonomy to
make decisions within certain boundaries. Marmoor, however, resists the
view that the point of law is to encourage moral reasoning or to express
102. Id.
103. Id. at 106.
104. See id. ("There is no role constitutive conventions can play in determining that people
should act according to moral reasons.").
105. Id. at 107-08.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra Part llI.B.3.
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societal judgments. 09 He can point to the fact that most laws do seem
aimed at controlling individual behavior according to social convention and
that purely expressive laws are controversial."l0 Likewise, Marmoor points
out that there is little purpose to a social convention to create "law" if
everyone would act in the fashion dictated by the "law" anyhow because of
their moral reasoning.' These points do seem fairly compelling; thus, it
might seem plausible to give Marmoor the benefit of the doubt and assume
that law has the necessary feature of guiding behavior.1l 2
Must all law actually guide behavior? In many legal systems, it
appears that the law only plays a small role in guiding the behavior of
citizens. (Often citizens will be unaware of the law, or disobey it for purely
rational reasons of self-interest.) Therefore, this requirement seems much
too strict. However, Marmoor's principle can be modified so that it only
claims that, necessarily, all law must claim to guide behavior. (Where
law's "claim" to guide behavior is spelled out in terms of an individual's
response to the legal system. Thus, if the law "claims" authority, then those
creating it claim that citizens must obey the law for some legitimate reason
or other.) This modification, based on Raz's idea that law necessarily
claims authority, seems more plausible." 3
If, however, the law must claim to guide behavior, then it seems it must
claim that subjects will in fact follow the rules identified by social
convention. However, the "rules laid down by social convention" (those
identified via a rule of recognition) are identified by all positivists as the
law. Thus, it seems that the hard positivist would be committed to the
following claim: Necessarily, the law must claim that it will, in fact, be
followed. Is it a necessary truth about the law that it makes such a claim
about itself? It is not obvious why this would be the case. However, if the
law claims that it must be followedfor some reason, or for no reason at all,
then all of the problems discussed with regard to Raz's notion of an
"exclusionary reason" arise. 114
The notion of a "guidance function" seems to be just as difficult to
establish as a necessary feature of law as Raz's notion of "authority"l15
109. See Marmoor, supra note 18, at 105.
110. Id. at 106.
111. Id. at 108.
112. Notice that Marmoor appears to assume that the purpose of those engaged in creating
law is to create rules that guide behavior, but the actual premise he needs to make analytic claims
about the nature of law is that the law itself must either actually guide behavior or "claim" to
guide behavior.
113. See supra Part V.A. See also Marmoor, supra note 18, at 105.
114. See supra Part III.B.4.
115. See supra Part III.
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(spelled out in terms of "exclusionary reasons"). There is, in fact, a link
between these two problem areas. In order to claim that the law necessarily
has some feature, hard positivists must show that all conceptually possible
legal systems agree about the feature in question. This is an extremely dif-
ficult task. If all that a law purports to regulate is human behavior, then the
mechanism used to do so ("authority," behavioral guidance by threat of
punishment, etc.) must be established as one as common to as many legal
systems as possible. However, meeting such a requirement, as I hope to
have shown, is daunting if not impossible.
2. Can Moral Principles Provide Partial Guidance?
One important question for Marmoor's account involves whether it is
committed to complete determinacy. Must the law always be specific
enough so that one can discern a unique course of action proscribed by it?
If this is the case, then much "law" would have to go. Anytime a "law" was
indeterminate even if only between two options, it would lose the feature of
behavioral guidance and, hence, could not be properly termed a law at all.
Of course, Marmoor may accept this result and claim that all legitimate
"law" is determinate and that the resolution of hard cases by courts merely
creates new law.' 16
If Marmoor allows for indeterminacy, however, then moral criteria of
legal validity must be admitted. For example, a legislature could pass a law
stating that the state may interfere with one's individual liberty only to pre-
vent harm to others, Now, the harm principle would be subject to analysis
and interpretation by judges and, thus, it would not guide their behavior
determinately. However, it would prevent them from considering a wide
range of non-libertarian options such as utilitarian doctrines and, thus, it
might be plausibly said that the legislature is guiding behavior to a certain
extent and allowing for the individual consideration of moral criteria of
legal validity. Thus, the quibble between hard and soft positivists might
turn on how determinate they think that law must be.
116. This does appear to be Marmoor's position. Marmoor, supra note 18, at 113-114. See
also supra Part III.B.2.
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V. SCOTT SHAPIRO'S HARD POSITIVISM
A. INTRODUCTION TO SHAPIRO'S PROJECT
Recently, Scott Shapiro has presented a reinterpretation of H.L.A.
Hart's soft positivist views.117 Shapiro's reinterpretation is a version of
hard positivism in which the concept of "epistemic guidance" plays a
prominent role." 8 He claims that one necessary feature of law is that it
provide such epistemic guidance to both ordinary citizens and officials in
authority.119 However, the function of law will differ depending upon to
whom it is directed.
B. THE GUIDANCE FUNCTION FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS
Shapiro incorporates Hart's claim that ordinary citizens are guided by
"primary rules" (rules that purport to directly govern individual behavior)
that must give them guidance concerning which standards of conduct are
legitimate and which are sanctionable.120 Thus, Shapiro gives the following
hard positivist argument as applied to law's guidance of ordinary citizens:
(1) Necessarily, law must guide individual conduct (i.e., perform
its epistemic function).
(2) Necessarily, "laws" telling people to "act morally" cannot
guide individual conduct (i.e. cannot perform an epistemic
guidance function). 121
(3) Therefore, "laws" telling people to "act morally" are not law.
This argument attempts to claim that any legal requirement purporting that
individual citizens must engage in moral reasoning to guide their behavior
is not a true legal requirement because it cannot, of necessity, perform the
function of guiding their behavior.
117. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 169-191.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 173.
120. Oddly enough, this is one of Lon Fuller's claims about the "internal morality" of law.
See Leiter, supra note 7, at 17-19. I will not pursue the debate between contemporary natural law
theory and positivism in general here.
121. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 176 ("Telling people that they should act on the rules that
they should act on is not telling them anything!") (emphasis added). Of course, "epistemic
function" should be interpreted loosely so that the law must recommend actions that are better





As with all hard positivist claims, many typical objections will arise. It
will be pointed out that many laws with no moral content fail to guide
behavior and require individual citizens to engage in analogical, economic,
historical, textual, or even scientific reasoning. Of course, the hard posi-
tivist can admit the implications of this position and claim that the law,
properly understood, provides epistemic guidance; thus, they can admit that
much of what we call "law" is not, strictly speaking law. This debate seems
to be inconclusive and so I will turn to other objections. 122
Several objections to the argument are apparent. First, the case of the
"omniscient ethicist" should be considered. Let us suppose that Virtuous is
an ethicist who has discovered all of the objective truths of morality. Now,
when confronted with a "law" such as "act morally," Virtuous will know
exactly what to do. Since she knows all of the truths about morality, the
law will provide her with perfect epistemic guidance. Thus, she will know
which standards of conduct are legitimate and which will lead to legal sanc-
tion. It is, of course, a contingent matter whether or not someone knows the
relevant moral truths and can guide their behavior appropriately. A hard
positivist could reply that, statistically speaking, most people are not like
Virtuous and, therefore, laws telling them to "act morally" will fail to guide
their conduct. This, of course, threatens to make the hard positivist con-
ception of law an empirical rather than a conceptual claim, and would lead
to endless debates over the nature and quality of moral knowledge within
any given population under discussion.
Fortunately, there is another, more compelling, reason to reject
Shapiro's argument. Laws often fail to guide behavior-for a variety of
reasons. Thus, Shapiro must modify his position to assert that it is a neces-
sary feature of law that it claims to guide behavior by providing citizens
with information about how they should and should not act. 123 With this
modification in place, Shapiro can argue that the law can only claim to
guide behavior if it provides definite instruction to ordinary citizens about
how they should behave. This conception apparently provides no "reason"
for ordinary citizens to obey the law. (If the "reason" for obedience were
force or threat of force, then the hard positivists' jurisprudence would
122. See supra Part III.B.2. I do claim that hard positivists will have a hard time denying
that judges using all of the paradigm modalities of constitutional reasoning cannot be said to be
establishing what the law is rather than, necessarily, creating new law.
123. This is akin to Hart's position that law must "claim" authority. HART, supra note 27, at
100-123.
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collapse into the Austinian model of law as rules backed by force124 which
is, now, universally rejected.) Thus, for ordinary citizens, it appears that
law need only be identifiable (via the Rule of Recognition) in order to fulfill
its function of (possibly) guiding their conduct.
Notice, however, that we have left the term "should" undefined.
Naturally, a moral reading of "should" must be eschewed by the hard
positivist because this would lead to the thesis that law necessarily claims to
have moral authority. But, if we read the term should in the sense of "can"
or "able," then the positivist will not have adequately explained the
authority of law to guide the conduct of ordinary citizens. Such a task will
have to be undertaken if the hard positivist seeks to explain how the law
claims authority over ordinary citizens. Perhaps, the hard positivist will
desire to view law as a "one-way projection of power"' 25 upon the ordinary
citizen and claim that, necessarily, one can know how to avoid legal
sanction only if one learns what the law is without engaging in any sort of
reasoning about the meaning of its "moral" terms.
As mentioned, such a radical claim seems to rule out the possibility
that the ordinary citizen can engage in reasoning about any of the terms
contained in the law. But, how does one even interpret the law without en-
gaging in reasoning about the meaning and nature of both its moral and
non-moral terms? As usual, the hard positivist will probably reply that only
laws with determinate meaning actually fulfill the requisite guidance
function and the debate will stalemate over how determinate the "law" must
be. 126
D. THE GUIDANCE FUNCTION FOR OFFICIALS IN AUTHORITY
Shapiro provides the following hard positivist argument designed to
show that those in authority cannot employ moral criteria of legal
validity: 127
(1) Necessarily, law must "motivate" authorities. [If a rule is a
law, then it must guide their conduct by providing them with an
exclusionary reason for D-ing.]
124. Id. at 18-25. Some philosophers believe that hard positivists cannot offer any
explanation of legal authority over persons. See generally Brian Bix, Jules Coleman, Legal
Positivism, and Legal Authority, 16 QUINNIPAC L. REv. 241, 241-254 (1996).
125. FULLER, supra note 23, at 192.
126. Most soft positivists think the law must allow significant room for interpretation.
HART, supra note 23, at 250-52 (arguing that soft positivism should require a degree of
uncertainty that can accommodate reasoning about moral terms).
127. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 178-180.
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(2) Only identification of a rule via a Rule of Recognition provides
authorities with an exclusionary reason for 'P-ing.
(3) Therefore, only rules identified via Rules of Recognition are
laws. 128
Shapiro adopts Hart's view that laws must motivate officials from the
"internal point-of view" and, thus, provide them with good reason to follow
"secondary rules."129 (Secondary rules are rules governing the interpre-
tation and creation of the behavior-guiding primary rules.) He adopts the
typical hard positivist view that the Rule of Recognition involves only
matters of social fact; thus, the law can be identified only by the consid-
eration of "facts." 130 In practice, one will identify the law through the
examination of pedigree criteria such as passage by a legislature, signature
by an executive, etc.
Of course, Shapiro's argument concerning the guidance of officials'
conduct is vulnerable to the objection that it employs the controversial
notion of an "exclusionary reason" for action in both of its premises.131 If
my arguments against the possibility of articulating a viable conception of
an "exclusionary reason" are correct, then Shapiro's argument will fail. As
I claim in Part III, the hard positivist is hard pressed to defend any notion of
an "exclusionary reason" which will be viable as a necessary feature of the
law. Since Shapiro retains the notion of authority first put forward by Raz,
he cannot escape my critique of Raz's version of hard positivism-at least
with regard to his concession that the law must motivate at least some
persons (officials) by giving them internal reasons for action.1 32
VI. CONCLUSION
If hard positivism is true, then there is some necessary feature of law
that cannot be exhibited by moral norms qua moral norms. In short, if hard
positivism is correct, then moral reasoning cannot help us to discover what
the law is. Almost all hard positivist arguments heretofore advanced focus
upon the concept of authority and explicate that concept in terms of treating
the law as an exclusionary reason for action. As I have demonstrated,
128. Some philosophers such as Jules Coleman reject this claim because they say that citi-
zens can learn what the law is from sources outside of the Rule of Recognition and, hence, the
Rule of Recognition itself can contain moral criteria of legal validity. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry,
Method and Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 1757, 1788-95 (2002). I will leave aside
this debate.
129. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 174-75.
130. Id.
131. See supra Part Im.B.4.
132. See supra Part mII (B)(4).
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however, there is little chance that a viable notion of an exclusionary reason
will be forthcoming. Thus, all extant versions of hard positivism face a
serious and potentially insurmountable difficulty. Of course, hard positi-
vists are free to claim that the law must, for some reason, be completely
determinate, and that this entails that no reasoning of any kind (whether
moral or otherwise) can help us to know what the law is. They could, then,
refuse to offer a complete analysis of the law by refusing to explain what
type of authority it must claim. If this route is taken, then the hard positivist
will be stuck with a partial account of law. In effect, they would claim that:
whatever other properties the law must have, it must exclude moral criteria
of legal validity. This seems very unsatisfactory. Therefore, I maintain that
the answer to the title question is "yes." Hard positivism is, indeed, too
hard to swallow.
